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PREFACE 
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of selected 
variables on Soviet grain imports. Linear regression techniques were 
employed to develop single equation explanatory models which tested 
and quantified the relationship between the price of Soviet export 
commoditie~ and the quantity of grain imported. The price of 
petroleum was identified as the most statistically significant 
independent variable and was used to estimate equations explaining 
Soviet grain imports. 
explanatory power. 
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The Soviet Union has been regarded as a key indicator of world 
food trade and grain prices since its reentry into world markets as a 
major grain importer in 1972. After being a net grain exporter for 
several years, the U.S.S.R. shifted abruptly to being a large net 
importer without advance indication to foreign governments or the 
grain trade. Two major reasons are advanced to explain this increase 
in demand: (1) a Soviet policy decision directed towards improving 
the dietary standard of the country and (2) an increase in the price 
of Soviet export commodities, especially petroleum. Before 1972, it 
was customary for Soviets to slaughter livestock in years of poor 
grain harvest. The policy decision to increase production and 
consumption of meat and dairy products required that imports of grain 
be maintained to offset domestic shortages and to avoid the practice 
of necessary slaughter. 
Soviet grain supply has grown to meet demand, but only in part. 
Figure 1 depicts Soviet grain production from 1955-1985. Average 
annual grain production grew from 129.4 million metric tons in the 
1955-67 period to 188.6 million metric tons in the 1968-80 period, a 
46 percent increase. This was more than sufficient to supply today's 
population at the consumption level of 1955, but not enough to improve 
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Figure 1. U.S,5,R. Grain Production, 1955-1985 
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standard of living has required not only more domestic grain 
production but also more grain imports, particularly of feed grain. 
Variability in Soviet crop production is extreme and obvious as 
depicted in Figures 2 and 3. Large year-to-year variations in Soviet 
crop production are often blamed for fluctuations in grain imports. 
Steep swings in grain production are often caused by fickle and 
unreliable weather conditions. As Soviets experienced poor crop 
production and stocks were depleted, they were forced to choose 
between curtailing livestock herds or entering world grain markets. 
Their decision to maintain livestock inventories and increase dietary 
standards has boosted imports of food and feed grains. 
While Soviet imports have not been large in relation to Soviet 
grain production (Figure 4) they are substantial in relation to world 
grain trade. Soviet imports in 1972-1973 accounted for 18 percent of 
the world trade in wheat and coarse grains, and world grain prices 
rose sharply with the unexpected increase in trade. In the next nine 
years, Soviet imports fluctuated widely from year to year and 
accounted for 4 to 22 percent of global trade 1n wheat and coarse 
grains. 
Increased population and simultaneous increases in incomes are 
also considered major reasons behind the increase in demand. The 
Soviet Union ranks third in terms of size of population after China 
and India. Between the census of 1959 and 1979, the Soviet Union 
added about 54 million people to its population. It is estimated that 
an additional two to three million have been added each year since 
that time (Clayton, 1985). During this same time frame, average 
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collective farm wages grew even faster. Growing incomes have expanded 
the effective demand for meat. 
Problem Statement 
U.S. farmers have become more reliant on international demand as 
a basis for growth. Historically, the U.S. has been one of the 
world's leading exporters of agricultural commodities. From 1951 
through 1981 the U.S. share of world agricultural exports averaged 16 
percent annually (Mackie, 1983). Agricultural exports have accounted 
for one-fourth of cash receipts for all farm products and one-fifth of 
total U.S. exports (Sharples, Webb and Holland, 1984). The U.S. 
currently exports the products of 40 percent of total harvested acres. 
Agricultural exports are not only significant to domestic farmers 
and ranchers, but also to the U.S. labor force and millions of 
domestic and foreign consumers. U.S. agricultural exports generate 
jobs in the U.S. farm supply industry, in processing, transportation, 
financing, merchandising, insurance and other areas of work involved 
in producing and marketing the nation's agricultural goods. Farm 
export earnings helped to pay for the nation's imports of petroleum, 
automobiles, electronic goods, textiles and other products purchased 
from abroad. Staggering deficits in net foreign trade would have 
resulted without large farm exports. 
Demand shifts affecting U.S. farmers are more likely to arise 
from international rather than domestic sources. Volatility in 
international food trade is often due to weather and normal market 
forces, but many of the more pronounced swings may be attributable to 
changes in various governments' policies with respect to food imports 
and exports. Reliance on agricultural exports by U.S. farmers makes 
the farm sector sensitive to fluctuations in international demand. 
Oklahoma's economy 1s heavily dependent on revenues from oil and 
gas production. Also, wheat 1s a major source of income for many 
Oklahoma farmers. Obviously, if the price of oil decreases, 
Oklahoma's state revenues decline. Less obvious, however, 1s how 
these same price fluctuations affect Oklahoma farmers. A decrease in 
the price of oil 1s likely to mean less hard currency available for 
the Soviet Union to purchase wheat and other grains, which may result 
in declining revenues for Oklahoma wheat farmers. 
Explaining Soviet demand is especially important to U.S. 
producers because of the direct impact on the agricultural sector 
created by large fluctuations in Soviet purchases over recent years. 
The Soviet Union is one of the world's largest importers of grain, 
currently accounting for almost 20 percent of all international trade 
(Moore, 1986). In 1986, the value of U.S. grain and feed exports fell 
from $11.9 billion to $8.6 billion. Much of this decline stennned from 
a 15.9 million ton decline in export volume, most of which represented 
lower exports to the Soviet Union. Tumbling oil prices in 1986 cut 
U.S.S.R. hard currency earnings and made importing less attractive. 
U.S. grain sales to the U.S.S.R. fell 11.6 million tons. U.S. wheat 
exports to the U.S.S.R. dropped to zero and corn exports to 2.7 
million tons as the u.s.s.R, harvested one of its best grain crops in 
nearly a decade. 
Fluctuations 1n Soviet grain production and imports have a major 
influence on the volume of grain traded in world markets and have 
considerable impacts on world grain prices. For this reason, grain 
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merchants throughout the world keep a vigilant watch on factors which 
might alter Soviet purchases such as weather and political 
developments. If terms of trade can be proven effective in evaluating 
such fluctuations, it may be used to explain Soviet imports of grain, 
thus facilitating appropriate policy decisions by the U.S. 
General Objective 
The overall objective of this study is to examine the 
relationship between the price of selected Russian export commodities 
and quantities of grain imports to the Soviet Union. 
Specific sub-objectives are: 
1. To describe price patterns of selected Russian export 
commodities; 
2. To describe Soviet grain import quantities and policies; and 
3. To quantify and test for the relationship between selected 
Russian export commodities and its grain imports. 
Hypothesis 
Fluctuations in the price of Russian export commodities, 
specifically gold, oil, natural gas and coal, have a quantifiable 
impact on Russian grain imports. 
Procedures 
1. Objective one will be achieved by: 
a. Identifying the types and respective prices of export 
commodities; 
b. Reviewing the literature regarding the reliability of 
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alternative data sources; and 
c. Using statistical tools such as regression to examine trends 
and seasonal components of selected Russian export cormnodity 
price series. 
2. Objective two will be achieved by: 
Conducting an extensive literature review on Soviet import 
and export policy. 
3. Objective three will be achieved by: 
Using linear regression to develop single equation 
explanatory models which test and quantify the relationship 
between the price of varied Soviet export commodities and the 
quantity of grain imported. Separate models will be developed 
with the quantity of coarse grains, wheat and total grain 
imported as the dependent variables. Explanatory variables could 
include, but not be limited to, the prices of oil, natural gas, 
coal and gold. Other explanatory variables could include the 
size of the Soviet grain harvest and Soviet livestock 
inventories. 
Thesis Organization 
A brief history and general background of the Soviet Union is 
presented in Chapter II. Emphasis in this chapter will be placed on 
agricultural policy and how those policies evolved. Chapter III will 
consist of a review of the relevant theory and terms of trade. 
Chapter IV will consist of the analysis of the data. Chapter V will 
be the summary and conclusions as well as the limitations of the 
study. 
CHAPTER II 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC 
General Background 
The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic encompasses one-sixth 
of the total land surface of the earth, the largest territorial entity 
1n the world since the 17th century. It is approximately two and one 
half times the size of the U.S. (Figure 5) and enjoys enormous wealth 
in natural resources. 
The U.S.S.R. possesses coal deposits amounting to about half of 
the world's known reserves (Hill, 1985). Natural gas and oil are 
available in abundance as the U.S.S.R. possesses the world's greatest 
natural gas and petroleum deposits (Harris in Cracraft, 1983). Almost 
60 percent of the world's peat, enormous forests for lumber 
production, plus tremendous potential for hydro-electricity on the 
great and swift-flowing rivers of Siberia contribute to Russia's 
natural resource base (Schwartz, 1968). 
In addition to basic energy resources, valuable minerals also 
exist in abundance. With some 40 percent of the world's iron ore, the 
U.S.S.R. possesses more than the whole Western world. The U.S.S.R. 
also possesses half of the world's potassium, and almost 90 percent of 
its manganese (Hill, 1985). The Soviet Union is the second largest 
producer of gold, only after South Africa and also has an array of 
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other mineral stocks vital to the modern industrial economy (Hecht, 
1982). 
Diamonds and other gemstones complete the impressive list of 
mineral resources. The Soviet Union has become one of the world's 
major producers of industrial and gemstone diamonds (Mathieson, 1975). 
Diamonds, after fossil fuels and precious metals, were the most 
significant foreign exchange earnings export of the U.S.S.R. (Bureau 
of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, 1982). 
The climate is continental: hot summers, cold winters, extremes 
of heat and cold, with fickle, unreliable weather patterns (Hill, 
1 9 8 5 ) • Climatic limitations impose severe restrictions on 
agricultural land use and many other economic activities throughout 
the Soviet Union. The majority of land is climatically comparable 
with Canada. Only one-third of the land in the Soviet Union lies 
south of the 49th parallel, while all of the U.S. except Alaska lies 
south of this line. Inadequate growing seasons or excessive winters, 
drought or excessive rainfall give rise to a series of landscapes, 
marshlands, steppes, permafrost zones and taiga, and create an 
inhospitable and sometimes unmanageable environment for a large 
portion of the country. 
History 
The Soviet Union 1s the inheritor of an established political 
system of considerable antiquity, but one which has been isolated from 
world developments throughout much of its existence. Russia's history 
can be seen as a repeating cycle: periods of stagnation followed by a 
discovery of the country's backwardness and frantic efforts to catch 
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up with its Western neighbors, often at the expense of the peasantry 
or agricultural sector. 
Peter the Great attempted to raise Russia to the standard of the 
already great nations of his time by establishing textiles, paper, 
iron, shipbuilding and other industries. By the time of his death, 
Russia had attained a level of administrative, industrial and military 
modernity equivalent to that of the power which she emulated. In his 
vigor to establish Russia as a modern industrialized nation, he 
assigned thousands of peasants to work in his newly formed mines and 
industries. As a result, Russian technical, industrial, and military 
capabilities leapt forward, leaving the peasantry in ignorance. 
During the reign of Empress Catherine the Great, the arts and 
literature flourished in Russia. However, the Russian people were 
little affected by these advances. The bulk of the population 
consisted of private or state-owned serfs; most of the populous, 
illiterate. 
A surge in Russian industrialization occurred in the 1890's when 
Serge Witte became the Czars Minister of Finance and assumed 
leadership for modernization. He believed that Russia needed an 
up-to-date industry to retain its independence. His greatest single 
accomplishment was the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This provided a great 
stimulus for industrial development. Between 1890 and 1900, Russian 
production of coal, oil, iron and steel roughly tripled and the 
country's rate of economic growth became the wonder and envy of much 
of the world (Schwartz, 1968). 
The initial reaction to Lenin's seize of power in 1917 was one of 
ludicrousy. It seemed incredible to Russia's affluent that Lenin, his 
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Marxists theorists, and inexperienced followers could govern such a 
complex state and economy and for advocates of a "workers state" to 
think of ruling what was primarily peasant Russia. Lenin, however, 
confounded the skeptics and maintained Bolshevik power despite 
numerous difficulties as well as civil war. He proved to be a master 
politician and his associates showed themselves to be adept 
organizers. During his reign, the struggle for food became a key 
economic factor. Grain was needed to feed his armies and when farmers 
withheld he resorted to force to obtain the crops. 
Lenin blueprinted what has become known in history as War 
Communism. At its peak, War Communism brought everybody and 
everything in Bolshevik-controlled areas at the direct service of the 
Soviet state's fight for military and economic survival. All banks 
were nationalized. Private ownership of large houses was abolished. 
All factories were nationalized and all trade became a state monopoly, 
and al 1 people were liable to labor service. The normal processes of 
the market place based on the use of money were largely wiped out. 
In 1921, Soviet economic conditions had been so bad and Communist 
party control of the population so shaky that Lenin found it necessary 
to make a major retreat by endorsing the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
Lenin introduced the NEP in which private trade and private industrial 
production was reintroduced. NEP virtually junked the idea of War 
Communism and encouraged individual initiative as an incentive. The 
NEP sought to restore free markets, competition and incentives of the 
old private enterprise system. The NEP catapulted the economy into 
flourishing years once again. However, the NEP was met with outrage 
by many Communists and was put to an end at Lenin's death in 1924. 
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The main issues of industrialization and economic development 
were decided by Joseph Stalin. Stalin was dictator of the Soviet 
Union for a quarter of a century (1928 until his death in 1953). His 
forced industrialization and modernization of the U.S.S.R. was so 
successful that at h-is death, the country was the second most powerful 
nation in the world and a serious economic, scientific and military 
rival of the United States. Upon the death of Stalin, the Soviet 
Union had atomic bombs, intercontinental missiles and space rockets. 
But, the Soviet people still lived in relative poverty. 
Stalin's economic development strategy consisted of large and 
continual investment in those branches of Soviet industry that 
contributed directly or indirectly to Soviet military strength, at the 
expense of other areas of the economy such as transportation, 
communications, housing and agriculture. The result was highly 
lopsided industrial development, with underdevelopment of the other 
areas. 
The heart of Stalin's problems, however, was the 25 million 
peasant families who made up most of the Soviet population. They grew 
the grain that Stalin so desperately needed to feed the expanding 
urban populous and for exportation in payment for foreign machinery 
and expertise. Collectivization of the peasantry was Stalin's answer 
to the agricultural problem. 
By 1950, Soviet agriculture had recovered from World War II 
except for the greatly reduced farm labor force - a result of extreme 
wartime casualties. During the 19SO's, the farm labor force consisted 
largely of women, older men and children. Given this composition, 
agricultural production in that period was remarkable. Output grew by 
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about four percent annually, nearly double the rate of growth in 
Western Europe or North America. With the death of Stalin in 1953, 
the rapacious exploitation of rural people by their government was 
largely brought to an end. 
By the time Stalin died, however, tensions resulting from the 
sacrifices he had extorted from the Soviet people made his heirs 
nervous about the security of their power. Khrushchev appeared in 
public as the apostle of a better standard of living for Soviet 
people. Khrushchev hastened the release of slave laborers from Soviet 
concentration camps and increased minimum wages and pensions of Soviet 
workers. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign argued for more 
investment in agriculture and the bringing in of new land into 
production. Prices paid to farmers were increased several fold. 
Investment financed by the state increased, as did output of farm 
equipment and of fertilizer. The gap between rural and urban incomes 
was greatly narrowed. The exploitation of the agricultural sector, or 
the pumping out of resources for the benefit of industrial investment, 
was halted. 
Krushchev campaigned for ploughing up virgin and fallow land, 
expansion of cultivated acreage of maize, and to "overtake America in 
production of meat and milk." He hoped that more wheat from the East 
would release land for fodder crops in European Russia, including his 
favorite, maize (Nove, 1980). The corrective measures taken by 
Krushchev in the 19SO's such as higher prices paid to producers, 
increased investment in the agricultural sector and the New Lands 
program had substantial if short-lived positive consequences. 
Overzealous efforts of plan fulfillment resulted in inefficiencies in 
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agricultural production such as ploughing up of lands which were 
unsuitable for cultivation, so as to overfulfill the virgin lands 
plan; and resistance to agronomically sound measures to conserve soil 
by increased fallowing and crop rotation. As for maize, it was 
cultivated, by order, to areas in which it could not flourish or would 
do so only if more fertilizer and equipment were available than 
actually existed (Nove, 1980). 
Six months after Krushchev's ouster, Leonid Breshnev outlined a 
comprehensive new farm policy, stressing increased farm prices for 
products and massive capital investments in agriculture. Breshnev was 
chosen to replace Krushchev because his colleagues believed he would 
be a more conservative leader than Krushchev. And he was. But, his 
refusal to contemplate significant economic reform was accompanied by 
a declining growth rate during his later years of leadership (Brown, 
1984). 
Andropov came into power in 1982, committed to stamping out 
complacency and corruption, determined to impose discipline, receptive 
to ideas of economic reform, and conscious of the need for 
rejuvenation of the party and state. In 1982, the party leadership 
had responded to the stagnation of the agricultural sector by adopting 
the U.S.S.R. Food Program. Like Breshnev's policy to improve 
agriculture, the Food Program dealt mostly with the need to increase 
investment in the agricultural sector and virtually ignored the 
underlying structural problems. ~y the end of 1983, Andropov had 
become incapacitated. 
One measure mentioned in the U.S.S.R. Food Program adopted by 
Andropov has seemed to hold promise for Soviet agriculture. This is 
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the "collective contract brigade," which ensures a close connection 
between earnings of personnel and final results of agricultural 
production. The collective contract brigade addresses two major 
structural problems: it motivates farm workers to exert the extra 
effort and attention needed to ensure efficient use of available 
resources; and it reduces interference from government in the details 
of agricultural production. This measure is seen by some Soviet 
leaders as the best way to achieve the goal of increased agricultural 
productivity. 
Chernenko succeeded Andropov in 1984. His thirteen months in 
office were little more than an extension of the Andropov 
administration. His policies focused on economic problems but made no 
provisions for agricultural reform. 
Agriculture plays an important role in Mikhail S. Gorbachev's 
plans to modernize and improve efficiency of the Soviet economy. 
Gorbachev has a history of supporting agricultural reform. As First 
Secretary of Stravropol Kraikom from 1970-1978, he was responsible for 
fulfilling agricultural quotas. He actively supported reform and 
authored several articles stressing the importance of "progressive 
experience" and use of progressive forms of organization and wages of 
kolkhoz members. He was later named Central Committee secretary 
responsible for agriculture. In 1980, he became a full member of the 
Politburo. Since becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev has moved very 
quickly to consolidate his power and to shake up the agro-industrial 
complex in order to improve agricultural performance, thus indicating 




The most important fact about the Soviet economy is that the 
Soviet government occupies a monopoly or near monopoly position 1n 
many sectors. It effectively owns and operates virtually all of 
Soviet industry, mass transportation, conununications, banking, foreign 
trade, education and social services, and much of Soviet agriculture. 
The basic planning period in the U.S.S.R. is five years. The 
first Five-Year-Plan lasted from 1928-1932 and was initiated as one of 
the first acts of Stalin for collectivization. Not all 
Five-Year-Plans run for five years. Several terms lasted only four 
years when the quotas were fulfilled a year early. And at least one 
Five-Year-Plan was extended due to war. The overall plan is devised 
by the Party and is under total central control. Historically, the 
chief goal of Soviet planning has been to facilitate the most rapid 
possible growth of the Soviet State's military-economic power 
(Schwartz, 1968). 
The first Five-Year-Plan 1n 1928 wrought various changes. 
Private trading that had developed under Lenin's New Economic Policy 
(NEP) was eliminated. The drive to collectivize farms was begun in 
1 9 2 9 • In all phases of the economy, an intensification of 
centralization and control became the rule. 
The primary purpose of the monopoly of foreign trade was that of 
protecting and supporting the industrialization program of the 
u.s.s.R. The import and export policies of the U.S.S.R. limit imports 
to those goods that contribute to socialist development and exports to 
those necessary to pay for needed imports. In early years this was 
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interpreted to include only imports of equipment and materials vitally 
needed by the U.S.S.R. More recently, however, this interpretation 
has been broadened to include the import of certain consumer goods 
needed as a part of the Soviet industrial incentive program. 
The element of surprise is often the most intriguing facet in 
Soviet import policy. A centralized planning agency performs all 
purchases and sales, and all imports are determined by this branch of 
government. Determinants of this policy are different from 
capitalistic countries. Demand and supply fac~ors have less influence 
on government pricing or import policies. Internal prices for nearly 
all goods are established by planners and do not consistently 
represent demand, supply, relative scarcity or actual costs. Prices 
serve more as an auditing tool for plan achievement than for 
allocative purposes in the U.S.S.R. (Jabara, 1981). 
Planners may be viewed as performing two functions: allocation 
of resources so as to promote economic growth and the allocation of 
resources so as to maintain some measure of equilibrium between the 
supply of and requirements for individual commodities. In a market 
economy, decisions reflected in the volume of grain imports are made 
by many independent agents who seek to maximize welfare in an 
environment of scarce or limited resources. In a planned economy, 
such behavior is not initiated by individuals in response to price 
signals, rather such behavior reflects policy decisions made by 
planners. Planners, rather than prices, tend to be equilibrators of 
supplies and requirements. Thus, efforts to understand grain imports 
from planned economies rest on our ability to understand the behavior 
of a small number of planners. 
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In theory, the concept of a closed economy is used to describe an 
economy with no external trade and which will be completely 
self-sufficient and insulated from external forces. A truly closed 
economy is virtually nonexistent. However, the Soviet Union strives 
for self-sufficiency and is often considered a closed economy. Its 
currency, the ruble is not exchanged on world markets. Thus, the 
Soviets depend heavily on barter and income generated by exports of 
natural resources for purchase of much needed imports. The more 
commonly recognized export commodities of the U.S.S.R. are oil, 
natural gas, gold, and coal. 
Soviet Agriculture 
Agriculture has not kept pace with the rest of the Soviet 
economy. This area of the national economy has been a political sore 
spot for decades. Numerous officials, even including the minister of 
agriculture and a member of the Politburo, have lost positions because 
of failure of the agricultural areas to feed the country. There are 
numerous reasons why this is such a weak area. 
Physical or geographical limitations to production are the most 
obvious obstacles to successful agricultural achievement. Although 
the U.S.S.R. is immense in size, most of the country is covered with 
forests, mountains, deserts and other natural barriers to production. 
Only 20 percent of the total land is conducive to cultivation, 
considerably less in comparison with the U.S. (Hetch, 1982). 
Very often the areas with the richest soils have the worst 
climatic conditions (Moore, 1986). In regions where soil is suitable 
for agriculture, rainfall is undependable. When rainfall is adequate, 
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the crops are rich. Every few years, however, little or no rainfall 
occurs and crops are very poor. In the other extreme Southern areas 
of the Soviet Union, an arid desert is also unsuitable for 
agricultural purposes. The great length and severity of winters 
prohibit the growing of many crops for a large proportion of the 
Soviet Union. Since the 19SO's, arable land in the U.S.S.R. has been 
expanded into marginal areas. Grain production, in particular, has 
been expanded into high risk regions. Heavy reliance on marginal 
lands makes weather an extremely important factor in determining grain 
yields (Moore, 1986). 
Inadequate investment in the agricultural sector also hinders 
productivity. Expensive draining operations are necessary in areas 
where rainfall is excessive. By the same token, costly irrigation 
equipment is necessary in drought-prone regions. A low priority of 
agriculture relative to industry in most planning periods has 
prohibited growth in the agricultural sector. 
The resistance of farmers to collectivization may also be a 
factor in low productivity in agriculture. Most peasants were 
forcefully collectivized in the late 1920's and 1930's. Stalin 
reportedly exploited the rural farmers by forcing them to sell their 
produce at prices well below production costs, while selling those 
goods at much higher prices. The profits extracted from the 
agricultural sector were used to finance the industrial and military 
sectors. Since then, much has been done to improve the standard of 
living of rural people. However, little personal involvement and/or 
inadequate incentives for the collective farmers has caused noticeable 
differences in yields (quality as well as quantity differences) on 
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collective farms versus private plots. The collective contract 
brigade, if endorsed, would help alleviate some of this problem, as it 
is a means of linking responsibility of the farmer to the final 
outcome of yield of the crop. 
There are three means of agricultural production 1n the Soviet 
Union: 
The collective farm (Kolkhoz): the average kolkhoz has 
approximately 6500 hectares of land with approximately 600 families 
living on it. Although the ground belongs to the State, all the 
property on it belongs to the members of the Kolkhoz (Hecht, 1983). 
The Kolkhoz contracts with the State to provide certain incentives and 
set quotas of a variety of commodities. If quotas are surpassed the 
Kolkhoz members can sell excess to the State at higher prices or sell 
on the open market at a considerable profit. Should production be 
below that promised to the State, members of the Kolkhoz will receive 
relatively little for their work and will undergo a period of 
deprivation, despite the minimum compensation law recently extended to 
collective farmers. 
The State Farm (Sovkhoz): The State farms are usually at least 
three times the size of Kolkhoz and contrary to collective farms, 
specialize in one product. All property on Sovkhoz belongs to the 
State. Farmers are paid a straight salary, independent of the size of 
the harvest. Most of the major land reclamation drives have 
contributed to the formation of Sovkhoz. 
Personal Plots: All members of both Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz are 
permitted to work a small parcel of land, usually one-half acre to one 
and one-quarter acres, depending on the quality of the land, for their 
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own private purposes. The owners of these plots may use the produce 
themselves, sell it to the State, or sell it on the open farmer's 
markets 1n urban centers. 
It 1s difficult to describe agriculture without mentioning the 
large grain shipments from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. 1n the 1970's when 
a new phase of Soviet grain trading policy began. This new policy 
sought to improve the welfare of Soviet consumers by increasing the 
supply of meats and animal products. Up until this time, grain 
imports as well as livestock inventories were dictated by crop 
harvests. A poor harvest meant imports of grain and livestock numbers 
which would have to accommodate grain shortages. 
Chapter Summary 
The Soviet Union encompasses a tremendous land mass and enjoys 
enormous wealth in natural resources. However, its agricultural 
sector lags in productivity. Physical limitations such as geographic, 
topographic and climatic conditions, as well as inadequate investment 
in agriculture, are in part responsible for the often unmet goals set 
for the Soviet agricultural sector. Increased cultivation on marginal 
croplands renders the Soviet Union vulnerable to extreme weather 
fluctuations. 
Throughout most of its history, Russian politics has favored 
industrialization while ignoring the importance of its agricultural 
sector. More recently, however, policies have been incorporated to 
improve the well-being of the rural dwellers, such as increased 
incentives to collective farmers and increased investment 1n the 
agricultural sector, with positive results. Gorbachev's background 
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and experience in agriculture provides an interesting changeup in the 
Soviet agro-industrial sector. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORY 
Terms of Trade 
International trade in the field of economics is concerned with 
the causes and benefits of trade between countries. Economic theory 
helps us to understand what determines trade patterns or why countries 
benefit from trade. Recently, fluctuating commodity prices, 
accompanied by swaying petroleum prices have revitalized the interest 
in the importance of international trade and its effects on trading 
partners. 
The study of international trade emerged in Europe around the 
16th through the 18th century in the era of mercantilist economics. 
The doctrine of mercantilism had many modern features: it was highly 
nationalistic, it viewed the well-being of the own nation to be of 
prime importance, it favored the regulation and planning of economic 
activity as an efficient means of fostering the goals of the nation, 
and it generally viewed foreign trade with suspicion (Soderston, 
1970). It was felt that each nation's self-interest was served best 
by encouraging its exports and discouraging its imports. 
Adam Smith emphasized the importance of free trade in increasing 
the wealth of all trading nations. He simplified his point by 
comparing nations to households. Since every household finds it 
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worthwhile to produce only some of its needs and buy others with the 
products it can sell, the same should apply to nations. His theory of 
absolute advantage was a powerful argument for trade. However, 
profitable international trade does not necessarily require an 
exporter to have an absolute advantage. 
David Ricardo strengthened the case for trade by introducing the 
concept of comparative advantage. A country need not have an absolute 
advantage in all or any goods to participate in and benefit from 
trade. The concept of comparative advantage suggests that trade will 
be beneficial as long as the country specializes in the activity where 
its absolute disadvantage is least pronounced or where it is "least 
worst''. Ricardo showed that the gains from trade will accrue to both 
countries even if one has no absolute advantage whatsoever. As long 
as the price ratios differ between countries in the absence of trade, 
every country will find some good which it can produce at a lower 
relative cost disadvantage than other goods. His emphasis on 
comparative costs reflects a more refined but sometimes less obvious 
concept of specialization. 
Yet, while Ricardo showed which goods should be exported and 
imported he failed to answer the question: on what terms goods will 
be traded. John Stuart Mills is credited with how terms of trade are 
determined, part of which can be inferred from Ricardo's theorem. 
Mill's contribution was determining imports and exports, not in terms 
of cost differences in the production of a given output, but in terms 
of different output produced at a given cost. The basis for trade 
exists in the differences in comparative costs. One country may be 
more efficient than another, as measured by factor inputs per unit of 
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output, in the production of every possible commodity but so long as 
it is not equally more efficient in every commodity a basis for trade 
exists. The law of comparative advantage says that it will pay the 
country to produce more of those goods in which it is relatively more 
efficient and to export them in.return for goods in which its relative 
advantage is least. 
Any review of terms of trade would be incomplete without 
mentioning the argument of Raul Prebisch that LDC's face a long term 
secular decline in their terms of trade. The primary argument is that 
international trade has been more beneficial for developed countries 
than for LDC's. This argument is based on the reasoning that prices 
received by non-oil producing LDC's for their exports of primary goods 
over the last several decades have been declining, while their import 
prices have been increasing. Therefore, the developing countries 
terms of trade have deteriorated with the result that real incomes in 
these countries have not increased, and their capacity to import has 
remained low. 
The traditional technique for determining the trade-equilibrium 
price ratio is by the intersection of the Marshallian offer curves of 
two countries. The offer curve can be derived by two methods, the 
locus of excess supplies and excess demands for commodities that are 
generated at different commodity price ratios, or through the 
derivation of the production possibilities curve and the domestic 
price ratio. 
In a two-country, two-commodity model, before trade starts, one 
distinct domestic price ratio exists for each of the two countries. 
These pre-trade price ratios are determined by labor requirements in 
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the production of each of the two commodities. The production 
function represents various technical production po~sibilities 
available to a country and shows the maximum output in physical terms 
for each level of the inputs in physical terms (Figure 6). Using the 
concept of a product transformation curve or production possibilities 
curve the production function can be represented in two-dimensional 
space. A product transformation curve can be defined as the locus of 
o~tput combinations that can be obtained from a given amount of a 
variable factor (Figure 7). Price ratios or domestic cost ratios can 
then be determined by the slope of the production possibilities curve. 
Each line exactly equals the slope of the production possibilities 
curve corresponding to that country (Figure 8). At different price 
ratios the offer curves can be established. Each point represents the 
amount of Xl offered at various prices for a given amount of X2. With 
the opening up of trade relations, these two different price ratios 
will be replaced by a single ratio. This international price ratio is 
generally referred to as the terms of trade. 
The terms of trade are determined at the point of intersection of 
the two offer curves (Figure 9). The shape of the offer curves is 
determined by both supply and demand conditions in the respective 
countries. The limits within which they will fall are given by the 
autarkic terms of trade in the two countries. With improving terms of 
trade, a country is willing to offer more and more of its exports for 
imports. Shifts in the offer curve result in changes in the terms of 
trade. For example, if the U.S. terms of trade were to improve via a 
shift in the offer curve from U.S. to U.S.' the new terms of trade 
line would be OB (Figure 10). Originally, the U.S. would be able to 
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Figure 7. Possible Gains from Trade (Soviet Union) 
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buy T amount of oil for S amount of wheat, while at the new terms of 
trade line the same amount of wheat (S) would purchase T' amount of 
oil. 
The causes behind such shifts 1n the offer curve are the forces 
that determine quantities offered and demanded by each country at 
different price levels. Those conditions which effect demand and 
supply are the primary motivators for these shifts in the offer curve. 
Aside from changes in demand and supply, the willingness of a country 
to export also impacts the terms of trade. The terms of trade, 
however, are not solely under a country's own control. Other things 
that might affect terms of trade are global patterns of demand, the 
market power of producers, and policy decision of other countries, 
1.e. tariffs or quotas. 
Some of the problems associated with trying to measure welfare 
through the use of terms of trade are that terms of trade merely 
record changes in relative prices of exports and imports. Terms of 
trade reflect nothing about the reasons behind such changes, such as 
quality of imports, the state of a country's balance of payments, or 
transportation costs. 
Implications for the Soviet Union 
Because of its monopolistic structure 1n foreign trade, the 
Soviet Union is often perceived as having a superior bargaining 
position 1n an otherwise competitive world grain market. The secrecy 
surrounding Soviet buying intentions allows it to split major 
purchases among several sellers in such a way as to keep the price of 
grain from rising until its purchases have been consummated. This, 
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combined with high oil prices has improved the terms of trade for the 
Soviet Union, enabling them to increase grain purchases. 
In Batra's model (1976), Soviet planners conduct domestic 
production and international trade such that they maximize a planner's 
preference function: U = U(X,G) where X is the composite export and G 
is grain subject to domestic production possibilities and trade. If 
both the Soviet Union and the U.S. exercise some market power, then we 
have the situation shown in Figure 11 where OC represents the 
s 
Soviet offer curve and OC represents the offer curve of the U.S. 
u 
If neither country tries to exploit its market power, trade will occur 
at point F, with the US exporting OGf of grain and importing OXf 
of Soviet export good. Prices of the two goods in trade are given by 
the slope of the line TTf. Soviet traders could increase their 
gains from trade at the expense of the U.S. by offering to exchange 
OXt of X for OGt of grain and thus trading at point T. By doing 
so they would move to trade indifference curve Ul, the highest 
attainable indifference curve given the U.S offer curve of OC . 
u 
Wolf (1978) has criticized the Batra model as requiring 
assumptions that are not necessarily consistent with the reality of 
Soviet planning and foreign trade decision making. Specifically, Wolf 
raises two objections. First, since Soviet production is planned 
there is unlikely to be any significant response either in annual 
plans or Five-year plans to changes 1n terms of trade. Second, Wolf 
disputes Batra's formulation of the planner's welfare function. In 
Wolf's view, planners are unlikely to substitute more of one good for 
less of another once production and consumption targets are set 
(Figure 12). 
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Wyzan (1981) employed production function analysis to examine a 
number of pivotal issues concerning the Soviet agricultural sector. 
Estimates of production functions for five Soviet agricultural 
commodities were presented. In general, his findings were supportive 
of the appropriateness of Soviet decisions; large farms seem to be 
more efficient, land-labor substitution is possible, and the outlook 
for output growth of most crops is good. He concludes that the 
technology of production does not account for the dismal performance 
of Soviet agriculture, and that weather alone may be the single most 
important explanation for variations in crop production. 
Desai (1982) estimated Soviet import demand for the years 
1981-1985 by using three different methodologies. First, he predicted 
wheat imports during 1981-85 as the difference between total supplies 
and requirements with the major components of the two categories 
estimated from simple regressions. Secondly, he modified his first 
methodology of forecasting grain output by fitting a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with constant returns to scale to alternative data 
sets, instead of from past trends. Thirdly, he predicted grain 
imports using an import demand function where explanatory variables 
were domestic production of grain, meat production, livestock 
inventories, a time trend, and from 1971 a dummy variable 
representative of policy decision to import grain to keep inventories 
of livestock steady. Among his major conclusions are: The USSR will 
import up to 32 million tons of grain in below average years, with 
wheat imports constituting 14 million tons. And, Soviet planners 
would be able to meet the foreign exchange costs of these imports. 
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Figure 13 illustrates the use of Soviet welfare criteria for 
choosing between Soviet grain production and Soviet imports of grain. 
L-shaped isosocial welfare curves assume that Soviet grain imports and 
Soviet grain production are perfect substitutes. The production 
possibility curve is represented by line AB. This line represents the 
quantities of domestic grain and imports of grain available given 
available resources. Point A represents the amount of domestic 
production that would be available if all resources were put into 
domestic production and imports were zero. This point would be a 
function of all physical constraints such as land availability, water 
resources, weather conditions and input availability. Point B 
represents the amount of grain that would be imported if domestic 
production were zero. This point would be a function of financial 
limitations such as the price of wheat, the prices of Soviet export 
conunodities, credit availability and transportation costs. 
If originally the Soviets were producing Q amounts of domestic 
grain and purchasing M amounts of imports, and if the terms of trade 
shifted in favor of the Soviets (for example the price of wheat 
declined or the price of petroleum increased) then the production 
possibilities curve would rotate from AB to AB 1• This shift would 
move Soviets to a higher isosocial welfare curve, from U to u1 . 
Assuming the rotation was due to an increase in the price of 
petroleum, exchange earnings would increase, allowing Soviets to 
purchase more imports, from M to M1 and also purchase more grain 
domestically from Q to Q1• 
However, if the price of oil declined we would expect the changes 
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curve would rotate from AB to AB 2 , and Soviets would be forced to a 
lower isosocial welfare curve, u2 . Imports would be expected to 
decline from B to B2 and Soviet grain production would decline from 
Q to Q2 • 
The Soviet Union is a special case in that it extracts benefits 
from the collusion tactics of the OPEC cartel. The cartel is a group 
of potentially competitive firms that coordinates its output and 
pricing decisions to reduce industry output below competitive levels 
and to raise prices and profits. The u.s.s.R. benefits from the 
efforts of the cartel by selling at the high price. 
In a free market economy, price is established through the forces 
of demand and supply, where many independent agents seek to maximize 
utility in the face of insatiable wants and limited resources. In a 
planned economy, planners rather than prices tend to be equilibrators 
of supplies and requirements. Planners seek to maximize social 
welfare, establish their own prices for goods and services, and 
determine what and how much is needed by the country. The question is 
what criteria is used to determine prices and quantities? Could the 
price of exports, the price of imports, or terms of trade be good 
indicators of what and how much is imported to the Soviet Union? 
Chapter Summary 
The study of international trade emerged in Europe around the 
sixteenth through the eighteenth century in the era of mercantilism. 
The importance of free trade was emphasized with the case 
strengthening through the concept of comparative advantage. Terms of 
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trade play an important and possibly increasing role in the 
determination of trade patterns. 
Because of its monopolistic structure in foreign trade, the 
Soviet Union is often perceived as having a superior bargaining 
position in an otherwise cdmpetitive grain market. In a free market 
economy price is established through the forces of demand and supply. 
In contrast, the planners of Centrally Planned Economies tend to be 
equilibrators of supplies and requirements. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
Data Requirements and Description 
Several potential variables were chosen to explain Soviet grain 
imports. These variables were ascertained through economic relevance 
and statistically tested for explanatory power of Soviet grain 
imports. Among these variables were Soviet grain production, Soviet 
livestock inventories, price series for petroleum, gold, coal and 
natural gas, Soviet population, and a dummy variable to account for 
Soviet policies concerning grain imports. Annual time series data 
were gathered for the 1960-1986 period. 
Soviet production data were acquired from U.S.S.R. Grain 
Policies and Data, by Emily Moore, International Economics Division, 
Economic Research Service, 1986. Annual Soviet grain production for 
all grain is reported in million tons for the years 1960-1985. From 
1955 to 1975 substantial information was published on Soviet grain 
production, areas and yields. However, in 1976 the Soviets largely 
stopped releasing such information. After 1980, data on grain 
production at the national level were no longer published (Moore, 
1986). Therefore, actu~l production data are documented through 1980, 
while 1981-1985 are USDA estimations, based on analysis. Soviet grain 
production data were gathered for wheat, barley, rye, oats and corn. 
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The Soviet definition of grain is in terms of bunker weight. 
Therefore, it can include excess moisture, pieces of straw, weeds and 
other forms of dockage. Grains include wheat, rye, oats, barley, 
corn, millet, grain sorghum, rice, buckwheat and pulses. 
Annual Soviet livestock inventories are reported in thousands of 
head. This information came from various issues of the Soviet Trade 
Yearbook and was generously provided by the Eastern Europe and Soviet 
Branch of the Economic Research Service. Included in the livestock 
data are cattle, cows, hogs, poultry and sheep. 
The price of gold is quoted at London in dollars per fine ounce, 
99.5 percent fine, average daily rates. These data were obtained from 
the American Bureau of Metal Statistics, Samuel Montagy Company, Ltd. 
Petroleum prices are reported in dollars per barrel for Saudi Arabian 
light crude petroleum, 34-39 degrees gravity, average official f.o.b. 
Ras Tanuna. These data were obtained from International Financial 
Statistics for petroleum. Coal prices for anthracite and bituminous 
coal were obtained from various issues of the Commodity Yearbooks. 
These were quoted in U.S. domestic dollars per ton. Gold and 
petroleum prices are plotted in Figure 14. 
Annual Soviet grain imports are reported in millions of tons. 
Included in total Soviet grain imports are wheat, corn, barley, rye, 
and oats. Total Soviet imports, wheat imports and coarse grain 
imports were treated as separate dependent variables. Total Soviet 
imports in million tons and petroleum prices were plotted together in 
Figure 15 to demonstrate their correlation. 
A dummy variable was created to reflect emotionalism in the grain 
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designated by a one in the year 1973 and all other years contained a 
zero. Before the change in Soviet import policy had become apparent, 
the Soviets were able to purchase what amounted to about one-quarter 
of the U.S. wheat crop in 1972. Because of western ignorance of 
Soviet buying intentions and competition among western sellers to 
dispose of surplus grain, the Soviets were able to purchase grain at 
favorable prices. The U.S. extended a 750 million Commodity Credit 
Loan to the U.S.S.R. and USDA subsidized exports so as to maintain a 
low selling price. This led to much criticism of the government's 
handling of grain sales and to efforts to prevent its repetition by 
requiring grain exporters to report sales to a single destination in 
excess of 100,000 tons per day or 200,000 tons per week to any single 
destination. The American public and the U.S. government appeared to 
be concerned that the events of 1972 might be repeated and this 
emotionalism spilled into the grain market. The dummy variable used 
in this model is therefore representative of the outlying 
circumstances surrounding Soviet purchases and market emotionalism in 
the world grain market for this unusual year. 
The accuracy of any research depends on the reliability of the 
data used. Much of the data in this research was supplied by ERS and 
parts are estimations by the USDA. Credibility for information from 
Soviet Trade Yearbooks is difficult to establish, however it is the 
best available, as many of their records are becoming less available. 
A summarization of the information for all dependent and 
independent variables is presented in Table 1. The first column 
reports each variable used. The following column reports the 
units. The next column reports the standard deviation and the final 
TABLE I 
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND RANGE 
FOR ALL VARIABLES, 1960-1986 
Standard 
Variable Units Mean Deviation 
xl (Total Grain Production) million ton 170.69 32.14 
x2 (Soviet Wheat Production) million ton 83.86 16.25 
X3 (Soviet Barley Production) million ton 37.84 14. 71 
x4 (Soviet Rye Production) million ton 12. 79 2.55 
XS (Soviet Oat Production) million ton 13.19 4.28 
x6 (Soviet Corn Production) million ton 10.82 2.53 
x7 (Price of Gold) $/fine oz. 180. 12 172.08 
XS (Price of Oil) $/barrel 10.62 11.SS 
Xg (Population) thousands 24S528.67 17201. 26 
XlO (Soviet Cattle Inventory) thousands 102.37 13.95 
x11 (Soviet Cow Inventory) thousands 40.80 2.70 
x12 (Soviet Hog Inventory) thousands 65.20 10.19 
xl3 (Soviet Sheep Inventory) thousands 138.84 4.87 
xI4 (Soviet Poultry Inventory) thousands 7SO. 04 240.68 
XIS (Price of Anthracite Coal) $/ton 33.85 24.84 
xI6 (Price of Bituminus Coal) $/ton I3. 39 8.90 
YI (Total Soviet Grain Iports) million ton I4. 62 I4.28 
y2 (Soviet Wheat Imports) million ton 8.15 7.78 
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two columns report the minimum and maximum values over the time period 
analyzed. 
Correlation between Independent Variables 
Another consideration when selecting variables for inclusion in 
the model is the presence of correlation between certain independent 
variables. Correlation between variables exists anytime one of the 
variables is functionally related to the other or jointly related to a 
same third variable. Perfect correlation exists if unit changes in 
one variable result in constant proportional changes in the other. 
The correlation matrix (Table II) shows the coefficients of 
correlation for all pairs of dependent and independent variables. 
Perfect correlation exists if unit changes in one variable result in 
constant proportional changes in the other. 
Those variables which showed a high correlation are gold and 
petroleum prices with a coefficient of correlation of 0.94. 
Interestingly, many variables showed a high correlation to petroleum 
prices: prices of coal 0.97 and 0.92, Soviet grain imports 0.911, 
wheat import 0.84, and coarse grain imports 0.867. Petroleum had very 
low correlation to crop production. 
Countless equations were estimated testing the statistical 
significance of all variables to Soviet grain imports. The objective 
was to ascertain the equation which had the highest explanatory power 
with statistically significant, correctly signed explanatory 
variables. The criteria used for eliminating certain variables from 
2 
the model were R values and observed significance levels of the 
TABLE II 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
xi X2 X3 X4 XS x6 X7 X8 X9 XIO xll x12 xl3 xl4 XIS x16 YI y2 Y3 
xi 1.000 0.890 0.9ll -0.227 0.831 -O.OS7 0.242 0.335 0.679 0.662 0.608 0.277 0.377 0.47S 0.38S O.S38 0.418 0.322 0.466 
X2 1.000 0.664 -0.263 0.6S6 -0.227 0.063 0.104 o.Sl4 0.444 0.436 0.102 0.126 0.224 0.14S 0.330 0.229 0.129 0.304 
X3 1.000 -0. 34S 0.842 -O. ll4 0.381 0.486 0.803 0.797 o. 722 0.421 0.559 0.623 0.564 o. 713 O.S58 0.446 0.604 
x4 1.000 -0.369 0.447 0.207 -0.22S -O.SS6 -0.501 -0.509 -0.302 -0.437 -0.316 -0.28S -0.427 -0.354 -0.253 -0.416 
XS 1.000 -O.IS6 0.485 0.561 o. 795 o. 792 0.695 0.481 0.589 0.704 0.613 o. 714 0.578 0.459 0.628 
x6 1.000 0. 111 0.032 -0.293 -0.214 -0.285 -0.009 0.045 0.016 -0.047 -0. 181 -0.070 0.033 -O.I68 
x7 I.000 0.943 0.827 o. 811 0.8I3 0.689 0.602 0.881 0.883 0.859 0.8Sl 0.76I 0.8I9 
XS I.000 0.828 0.8II o. 735 o. 705 0.638 0.749 0.978 o. 925 0.9II 0.84I 0.867 
x9 1.000 0.986 0.928 0.649 0.658 0.92I 0.875 0.932 0.849 0.765 0.824 
XlO I .000 0.950 o. 72I o. 709 0.90I 0.839 0.896 0.824 o. 734 0.8I3 
XII I.000 0.557 0.6I7 o. 780 0.752 o. 779 0.729 0.661 o. 708 
xI2 1.000 0.673 0.833 0.688 0.7I8 0.692 0.634 0.663 
X13 1.000 o. 719 0.664 o. 705 0.593 0.477 0.639 
xI4 I.000 0.963 0.978 0.9I8 0.8473 0.879 
xI5 1.000 0.965 0.9I8 0.855 0.866 
xl6 1.000 0.890 o. 784 0.881 
YI 1.000 o. 940 0.935 





coefficients in question. The best model attained used petroleum 
prices and a dummy variable as independent variables. 
Statistical Results 
Three equations were estimated to explain Soviet grain imports. 
These equations were used to incorporate three dependent variables, 
annual Soviet imports of all grain, annual Soviet imports of wheat, 
and annual Soviet imports of coarse grains. In all three equations, 
the same independent variable, the price of petroleum and the dummy 
variable were used. The explanatory power of these variables was 
significant enough to render them solely in an estimation of Soviet 
grain imports. Therefore, the equations used in the statistical 
analysis were: 
where Yl =Annual Soviet imports of all grains, x8 =Price of 
petroleum, and n1 represents import policy change. 
(2) 
where Y2 = Soviet wheat imports and 
(3) 
where Y3 = Soviet coarse grain imports. 
Results of Estimated Equation (1) 
The results of the ordinary least-square regression estimation of 
Equation (1) for the specified variables are reported in Table III. 
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The estimated coefficient for the price of oil on total Soviet imports 
is 1.17. The sign is positive and consistent with economic theory. 
This coefficient has a t-value of 13.61 and is significant at the .001 
probability level. The estimated coefficient for the dummy variable 
is 18.45 and has at-value of 3.72 and is significant at the .001 
probability level. The calculated F-value for Equation (1) is 94.59 
and is significant at the .001 probability level. The coefficient of 
determination CR 2 ) value is .896. This indicates that the estimated 
Equation (1) accounts for 89.6 percent of Soviet grain import 
variation over the analyzed time period. The Durbin-Watson D-value 
for autocorrelation for 25 observations in Equation (1) was 2.093 
which indicates that at the .01 significance level no evidence of 
autocorrelation existed. The actual Soviet grain imports were plotted 
with the predicted values for the estimated Equation (1) in Figure 16. 
Predicted imports appear to follow the trend of actual imports for 
the analyzed time period. 
Results of Estimated Equation (2) 
The results of the ordinary least square regression estimation of 
Equation (2) for the specified variables are reported in Table IV. 
The estimated coefficient for the price of oil on Soviet wheat imports 
is .59, has a t-value of 9.12 which is significant at the .001 
probability level. The sign is positive and consistent with economic 
theory. The parameter estimate for the dummy variable is 11.81, the 
t-value is 3.14 and is significant at the .005 probability level. The 
calculated F-value for Equation (2) is 43.53 and is significant at the 
.001 probability level. The R2 value is .789. Actual Soviet wheat 
TABLE III 
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF SPECIFIED VARIABLES 
REGRESSED ON Y1, TOTAL SOVIET 
GRAIN IMPORTS (EQUATION 1) 
Equation (1) yl = f(X8 , Dl) 
Estimated Equation yl = 2.290 + 1. 169X8 + 
(t-values) (2.739) (13.613) 
Probability > t 0.096 0.001 
Selected Model Results 
n = 25 
F-value = 94. 590 
Probability > F = 0.001 
R2 0.896 
Adjusted R2 = 0.886 
Durbin/Watson = 2.093 
First Order Autocorrelation = -0.131 
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Figure 16, Actual Soviet Grain Imports and Predicted Soviet Grain Imports, 1960-1985 
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imports were plotted with the predicted values for Soviet wheat 
imports for the estimated Equation (2) in Figure 17. Predicted values 
for wheat seem to follow the same pattern as for total grain imports. 
Actual values seem more varied. The Durbin-Watson calculated D-value 
is .920 for 25 observations in Equation (2). This indicates that the 
error terms were positively autocorrelated. Because autocorrelation 
was apparent in the estimated Equation (2), corrective measures were 
taken and a new equation (Equation 2a) was estimated. 
Results of Estimated Equation (2a) 
The results of the estimation of Equation (2a) corrected using 
generalized least squares for positive autocorrelation are reported in 
Table V. The parameter estimate for the price of petroleum is .60, 
has at-value of 6.752 and is significant at the .001 probability 
level. The parameter estimate for the dummy variable is 11.70, has a 
t-value of 3.66 and is significant at the .002 probability level. The 
total R2 value is .84. Actual Soviet wheat imports were plotted 
with predicted values for Soviet wheat imports for the estimated 
Equation (2a) which was corrected for autocorrelation (Figure 18). 
Predicted values appear to be closer to actual value than in the 
estimated Equation (2). 
Results of Estimated Equation (3) 
Table VI reports the results of the estimated Equation (3), where 
petroleum prices and a dummy variable were regressed on Y3 - Soviet 
coarse grain imports. The estimated parameter for the price of 
petroleum is .57, has at-value of 8.90 and is significant at the .001 
TABLE IV 
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF SPECIFIED VARIABLES 
REGRESSED ON Y2, SOVIET WHEAT 




Probability > t 
Selected Model Results 
n 
F-value 




First Order Autocorrelation 
y2 = f(X8 , Dl) 
y2 = 1. 787 + 0.593X8 + 
( 1. 790) (9.120) 
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Figure 17. Actual Soviet Wheat Imports and Predicted Soviet Wheat Imports, 1960-1985 
Equation (2) 
TABLE V 
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF SPECIFIED VARIABLES 
REGRESSED ON Y2 (EQUATION 2a) 
CORRECTED FOR AUTOCORRELATION 
y2 = f(X8 , Dl) 
Estimated Equation y2 = 1.839 + 0.604X8 + 
(t-values) ( 1. 309) (6.752) 
Probability > t 0.204 0.001 
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Figure 18, Actual Soviet Wheat Imports and Predicted Soviet Wheat Imports Corrected 
for Autocorrelation, 1960-1985 
TABLE VI 
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF SPECIFIED VARIABLES 
REGRESSED ON Y3, SOVIET COARSE 
GRAIN IMPORTS (EQUATION 3) 
Equation (3) y3 = f(X8' Dl) 
Estimated Equation y3 :;:: 0.523 + 0.574X8 
Ct-values) (0.529) (8.903) 
Probability > t 0.602 0.001 
Selected Model Results 
n = 25 
F-value 39.828 
Probability ) F = 0.001 
R2 0.784 
Adjusted R2 = 0.764 
Durbin/Watson = 2.115 
First Order Autocorrelation = -0.062 
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Figure 19. Actual Soviet Coarse Grain Imports and Predicted Soviet Coarse Grain 
Imports, 1960-1985 
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probability level. The estimated parameter for the dummy variable is 
6.63, has at-value of 1.78 and is significant at the .089 probability 
level. The sign of the coefficient is positive and consistent with 
economic theory. The calculated F-value for Equation (3) is 39.82 and 
is significant at the .001 level of probability. The R2 value is 
• 7 8 • The Durbin-Watson D-value is 2.115 and indicates no 
autocorrelation. Actual Soviet coarse grain imports were plotted with 
predicted values of coarse grain imports for the estimated Equation 
(3) in Figure 19. Predicted values appear to closely follow the trend 
of the actual values. 
Chapter Summary 
Three equations were determined best to explain Soviet grain 
imports. Two independent variables, price of petroleum along with a 
dummy variable were used to predict describe Soviet grain imports, 
Soviet wheat imports and Soviet coarse grain imports. The explanatory 
power of these independent variables were high in all three equations. 
This indicates that the price of petroleum is useful in explaining 
Soviet grain imports. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The importance of the Soviet Union as a grain importer is 
exemplified by its power to affect grain prices in world markets. 
Over the past fifteen years, Soviet imports have fluctuated 
dramatically from year to year accounting from 4 to 22 percent of 
world trade in wheat and coarse grains. As Soviet purchases increase 
or decrease, the effects of price changes are felt world-wide. Grain 
traders around the world keep a close watch on factors which might 
indicate changes in Soviet imports. 
The Soviet Union encompasses a tremendous land mass and has an 
abundance of natural resources. Petroleum, natural gas and coal are 
among their basic energy resources. Minerals such as iron ore, 
potassium, manganese, gold, silver, platinum and uranium also exist in 
abundance. The Soviet Union has become one of the world's maJor 
producers of industrial and gemstone diamonds. 
The climate is continental: hot summers, cold winters, with 
fickle and unreliable weather patterns. Inadequate growing seasons 
coupled with extreme weather conditions, excessive winters, drought 
and rainfall impose severe restrictions on agricultural land use. 
Soviet agriculture is hindered by a series of maladies. The most 
obvious is physical limitations. Although the U.S.S.R. is immense in 
size, most of the country is covered with forests, mountains, deserts 
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and other natural obstacles to production. In regions where soil is 
suitable for agriculture, climatic conditions often prohibit 
productivity. The great length and severity of winters prohibit the 
growing of many crops for a large proportion of the Soviet Union. 
Inadequate investment in the agricultural sector also hinders 
productivity. Throughout most of its history the Soviet union has 
favored industrialization as a means of growth while ignoring the 
significance of its agricultural sector. There seems to be a rising 
awareness of the importance of agriculture in the U.S.S.R. as more 
investment in agriculture seems to be taking place. 
The U.S. has historically been one of the world's leading 
exporters of agricultural commodities. However, the significance of 
agricultural exports is not limited to farmers and ranchers. U.S. 
agricultural exports generate jobs that extend to many areas of the 
economy, such as the farm supply industry, processing, transportation, 
financing, merchandising and insurance. 
Reliance of U.S. farmers on international demand as a basis for 
growth has led to volatile prices and incomes for U.S. farmers. 
Oklahoma's economy is primarily dependent on agriculture and petroleum 
production for revenues and is very much affected by happenings abroad 
such as fluctuating petroleum prices which affects Soviet capacity to 
import. Thus, when the price of oil declines, Oklahoma suffers not 
only from lost petroleum revenues, but, also from the potential threat 
of a decline in international demand for grain imports, especially 
from Soviet sources. 
The Soviets do not exchange the ruble in world markets and rely 
heavily on exchange earnings generated by the exportation of natural 
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resources or other export commodities. Among the major export 
commodities of the Soviet Union are petroleum, gold, natural gas and 
coal. Time and price series data were collected for these variables 
as well as for Soviet crop production and livestock inventories. 
These variables were tested for statistical significance and 
explanatory power of Soviet grain imports, Soviet wheat imports, and 
coarse grain imports. Of these variables, the price of petroleum 
repeatedly proved highly significant for Soviet total grain imports, 
as well as for wheat and coarse grain imports. The equations 
estimated consistently showed high explanatory power and predicted 
import values trended towards actual import values. The results were 
consistent with economic theory. 
A dummy variable was introduced 1n the equations to reflect 
market emotionalism in response to a Soviet policy option to increase 
imports to meet the needs of increasing dietary standards. This 
decision meant maintaining livestock inventories instead of mandating 
livestock slaughtering in years of poor crop harvests. This variable, 
when included in the equations, increased explanatory power of the 
model. 
Theoretically, as the price of an export commodity such as 
petroleum increases, exchange earnings are increased making imports 
look more attractive. Therefore, when the price of petroleum 
increases, the production possibility curve shifts outward, and moving 
to a higher isosocial welfare curve allows an increase in the amount 
of imports that the country can afford. Domestic production is also 
likely to increase because of the increased funds available to invest 
1n the agricultural sector. However, if the price of a major export 
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commodity declines, we can expect the opposite movement to occur: 
less exchange earnings, less purchasing power of the country, a 
decline in imports and domestic productivity. 
This seems to be a fairly good representation of Soviet actions 
concerning import policy. As the price of petroleum has fluctuated 
over the years, imports have also increased and decreased 
correspondingly. Thus it is the conclusion of this paper that 
petroleum prices have a significant impact on Soviet grain imports and 
can be used in an explanatory capacity. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Other variables which might be tested for explanatory power of 
Soviet grain imports would be other foreign exchange earners. Diamonds 
are the second leading foreign exchange earner after mineral fuels. 
They were not used in this study because of a lack of data. Other 
suggestions for research would be to separate the time frame of data 
sets into two separate periods, for example before and after 1973. 
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